| MATERIALS AND METHODS

| The data
A total of 504 telephone interviews with practicing physicians in Northern Germany were conducted during August and September, 2014 by a specialized survey institute. A random sample of resident doctors based on phone directory data was drawn. According to the German Medical Association 12 and the National Association of Statutory Health Insurance Physicians, 13 male/female, specialist, and single practice proportions are representative of nationwide data. A specific questionnaire was developed as published material was not suitable to cover MC participation and associated physician characteristics in the German context. The questionnaire design was based on 2 steps, ie, a literature survey (covering, eg, Klabunde et al, 14 Johnson, 15 and Way et al 16 ) and a subsequent pretest among 40 physicians.
The questionnaire was semistructured. Topics covered include German physicians' MC participation, possible rejection of MC contract offers, physician collaboration, and practice characteristics such as size, number of physicians, and location. See Table 1 for the complete list of variables used in this study. Here, the binary dependent variable rejection reads "Have you ever rejected a specific MC contract offer by, eg, management companies, physician groups or insurers?" The binary specialist variable distinguishes general practitioners (GPs) from medical specialists. Note that 5 specialty groups are distinguished in more detail (bottom of The research project was briefly explained prior to the start of the interview. The University of Lueneburg, Germany, was named as the project initiator. The duration of the interviews was 15 minutes on average. Note that the well-known difficult accessibility of practicing physicians during office hours is reflected by a median number of 6 contact attempts prior to a successful interview.
| Econometric methods
In our quantitative model, the binary variable "rejection" is used as the dependent variable (row no. 1 in Table 1 ). The set of independent variables (row nos. 2 to 37 in Table 1 ) is used to identify potential associations with MC rejection in a multivariate setting. The analysis is based on probit models in which rejection probability is related to the independent variables via a standard normal cumulative distribution function. See, eg, Wooldridge 19 for technical details.
A potential complication for the application of the model arises, however, because of the fact that our sample is censored by including only those physicians who received a preceding MC contract offer by an insurer. Put differently, the survey does not contain any information on the rejection behavior of those physicians not selected by the insurer as suitable MC candidates. In this situation (under weak assumptions), a classic sample selection problem may arise. If so, inferences about the behavior of out-of-sample physicians may be incorrect. To illustrate the problem, note that the selection of target physicians by insurers will almost certainly be driven by some unmeasurable variables that also have an influence on their rejection probability (eg, prior informal cooperation). Consequently, a standard rejection equation may overestimate or underestimate the out-of-sample effect of the measurable variables.
We address this problem in the way discussed by Heckman, 20 which was also applied by van de Ven and van Praag 21 to the case of a probit selection equation and a probit outcome equation, cf. Section 3.2 for details. The "mean" columns refer to proportions for binary variables. P values in the "t test" column are based on individual tests without multiplicity correction. *P < .1. **P < .05.
***P < .01.
| Hypotheses
We briefly discuss the set of explanatory variables in our econometric model to derive corresponding hypotheses.
First, based on theory and the extant literature, we hypothesize specialists to be more likely to reject MC contracts (ie, we expect a positive sign) because of family doctors' prominent role as gatekeepers in German MC. 10, 22 Next, as German MC is primarily designed to foster cooperation between health professionals, one may expect the number of physicians to be positively related to MC contract rejection. The reasoning may be based on the argument of "in-house" cooperation, ie, a larger number of physicians may serve as a substitute for MC, thus rendering formal MC contracts less attractive. By contrast, the number of coworkers may decrease the MC rejection probability because coworkers may take care of office work and administrative requirements, which are negatively associated with MC and which are clearly off-putting to many physicians when facing an MC contract, cf. Section 3.3. As undersupply of health care in rural areas is a current problem in Germany, 23 rural physicians may be expected to consider MC contracts as a chance to increase their patient base. We thus expect rural physicians to be more likely to accept MC contracts (with contrasting reasoning for metropolitan). The age of owner variable is expected to have a positive impact on MC rejection as, in general, age may be seen as negatively related to innovation. In addition, from an economic point of view, one may also argue that the net present value of time and monetary investments in MC (which often requires a long-term horizon) decreases with increasing physician age. Next, note that practice size may have a negative impact on rejection because some MC measures may be space-consuming (such as extra rooms for special treatments offered under MC), thus lowering the expected financial burden for larger practices. The female (practice head) variable is considered purely exploratory as no prior results are known from the literature and no sound economic reasoning comes to mind (except for a positive impact on rejection when considering female part-time work which may be less likely with MC). In Germany, private insurance is largely cut off from MC considerations. Here, clearly, a positive impact on rejection is expected as no direct economic benefit for private practices may be derived from MC participation at present. Finally, age of equipment may be positively associated with rejection as many MC plans require up-to-date technical devices to guarantee a high (measurable) level of treatment quality.
The role of the remaining variables is largely ambiguous a priori. We consider the analysis of these factors as exploratory.
| Qualitative methods
We complement our quantitative approach with a basic qualitative research framework. This step enables us, first, to gain additional insight into the underlying mechanisms of MC development by giving each physician the chance to reflect on her or his contract refusal using a free-text answer. Second, we will be able to contrast the quantitative results with the qualitative answers to cross-check and validate our model-based findings in Section 4.
Precisely, physicians who ever rejected a concrete MC contract offer were asked to expand on the reasons for their rejection. Interviewers were instructed to capture the free-text answers in detail (using full sentences and to inquire again if necessary). A classification scheme was applied and harmonized by the 2 authors to identify underlying answer categories. In doing so, we focused on an application of a summative content analysis approach 24 based on the methodological framework of "grounded theory." 25 3 | RESULTS
| Sample characteristics
Descriptive sample statistics for all variables are reported in Table 1 . The right-hand part of the table compares the "rejecter" and "nonrejecter" subsamples. Note that among the total of 504 interviews, an MC contract offer was received by 109 physicians of whom 64 rejected the offer. Variations in N are because of partial nonresponse.
The 59% share of physicians refusing to participate in a specific MC contract offer is a striking candidate to partially explain Germany's low MC level. Approximately 45% of the surveyed practices are located rurally (which is difficult to mirror with official numbers as the location assessment is purely subjective 3.2 | Probit analysis Table 2 displays the results of 5 binary probit regression models (without sample correction, which will be addressed below) using "contract rejection" as the dependent variable and different subsets of physician (practice) characteristics as independent variables.
The base specification (model I) focuses on main practice characteristics, including "number of physicians," "rural practice location," "age of practice owner," "practice size," and "private patient share," that turn out to be significant.
Algebraic signs are as expected and will be further discussed in Section 4. Model IV focuses on the potential influence of medical specialty on MC contract rejection where the missing estimate for "specialty II" stems from the fact that there is only 1 observation for this variable among rejecters. Recall that the descriptive results of Table 1 suggest that certain medical fields may exhibit differing MC preferences (ie, going beyond the usual focus on GPs' well-described gatekeeping role). Again, the findings of the base model are confirmed and complemented with a significantly higher rejection probability for "neurology and psychiatry."
As German health care suffers from increasing rural undersupply and an aging physician workforce, 23 model V focuses on the combined effect of both variables to reflect a potential interaction effect in elderly and rural physicians' rejection behavior. In addition, the potential interaction of rural location with private patient share is included. The reasoning is that rural physicians may be less likely to reject MC offers even under higher private patient shares in view of lower overall income. However, no significant results and no structural changes compared to model I are found.
According to the Wald chi2 statistic (to test whether a naïve null model with no independent variables can be rejected), all models except for model II are significant at a 10% level. The information criteria (ie, AIC and BIC) clearly favor the parsimonious base model, which also yields a Wald chi2 statistic that is significant at the 5% level, cf.
Greene and Hensher 28 for a discussion. Finally, the presence of a potential selection problem is addressed by a Heckman approach adapted to probit modeling, cf. Section 2.2. The model entails a selection equation (to reflect whether the event "MC contract offer received" was observed) in which an identifying variable has to be included that is not present in the model equation; see Wooldridge 19 for details. To this end, "practice age" was considered suitable as it may increase practice visibility and, hence, the physician's probability to be selected for an MC contract offer by the insurer. We apply Stata's heckprobit command. 29 For the preferred base model (model I), the results for the selection equation are given in the right-hand column of Table 2 (results for the outcome equation are not shown). The approach yields a P value of .1524 (chi2 (1) = 2.05) for the Wald test of independent equations.
Hence, the hypothesis of a standard probit model without sample selection cannot be rejected. We also consider the selection versions of models II to V, which all show insignificant results (not shown in Table 2 ). Consequently, we focus on the interpretation of the standard probit results (models I to V in Table 2 ) in the remainder of the study.
| Qualitative results
A total of 63 free-text statements enter our analysis. The 2 authors independently classified the statements into superordinate categories. To identify an appropriate scheme, each free-text answer could be assigned to up to 3 categories in the first place resulting in a total of 104 assignments (ranging from strong to moderate to rather weak accentuation). This procedure was used to capture the spread of information and to retain substantial interrelations represented in each single statement. Discrepancies were discussed until consistency was reached for 6 major answer categories. The findings are reported in order of quantitative importance:
• Administrative burden: Here, physicians emphasize that time constraints and heavy workload resulting from usual office hours overstresses their capacity to serve the strict process and documentation requirements related to MC ("no need for additional bureaucracy, too much input, not enough time" and "too formal and not feasible").
• Professional autonomy: Strongly associated with the first category, we find that many physicians feel threatened by giving up part of their professional autonomy in the course of MC. For example, physicians complain about tight external treatment regulations and workflows under MC ("I did not like the conditions. They were too restrictive for me"). Further, physicians are reluctant to give up professional freedom as to the treatment of patients ("did not want to be restricted through such a contract").
• Financial aspects: Many contracts were deemed "financially unattractive." We find that statements in this direction are often strongly related with the category "administrative burden" ("it is lot of work and earns to little").
• Patient benefit: First, physicians report that they disagree with the fact that MC entails patient discrimination with respect to treatment. Statements related to this category cover both problems with running separate processes ("I am not able to run ten different types of cooperation") and the general aversion to treating patients unequally ("some insured will be favored"). Second, physicians do not see many benefits of MC in comparison with SC ("do not have the feeling that the patients will benefit" and "too small additional benefit").
• Risk: Some physicians complain about necessary a priori investments when entering an MC contract and, hence, increased financial risks. This refers in particular to technical or administrative infrastructure related to MC ("I would have been forced to make financial investments in advance").
• Mismatch: Some physicians report a mismatch between the aim of the contract and their specialty or practice orientation, mainly because of the small number of eligible patients ("too small number of patients," "economically negligible," "not sufficiently expendable").
| DISCUSSION
Two main avenues for political measures to promote German MC development come to mind in light of the results in Section 3.
For one, policymakers should rethink whether their focus on institutional measures (eg, the innovation fund) has unduly discriminated against "small" players such as single practices (who bear a fundamental part of the administrative burden of MC) versus "large" players such as health insurers or management companies (who are more likely to tap institutional MC funding). In particular, low financial incentives (rough estimates center around EUR 100 per MC enrollee) and high administrative MC workloads (eg, documentation requirements, double budgets) imply that physicians' participation constraints to engage in MC have frequently remained unsatisfied. Second, our results reveal significant characteristics among physicians who rejected MC contract participation-a fact that may justify a closer look at their preferences to design specific policy measures to win over different physician target groups to MC:
• First, note that the segmentation of health insurance into a private and statutory sector is detrimental for MC development as the budget for private health insurance, and hence, the participation of private physicians is practically excluded from MC. Note that most physicians follow a dual private/statutory patient strategy where, on average, a 10% private patient share accounts for roughly 20% of total practice income leading to conflicting interests. • Policy may also focus on increased knowledge about physician heterogeneity. For example, physician age and the number of physicians per practice are identified to significantly increase the MC rejection probability, cf.
Section 3. This result suggests that pure "coworking" is still perceived by physicians as a substitute for MC.
Obviously, more informational work on the merits of MC (which, in addition to coworking, offers, eg, large networks, education, increased budgets) is needed. These findings are also complemented by our qualitative results, which show that MC is frequently blamed for restricting professional freedom. Obviously, the synergetic potential under MC (in an economic and medical sense 32, 33 )
has not yet been fully recognized among German physicians, which would suggest the need for a more focused and targeted MC promotion policy. Note that in the related context of acceptance of pay for performance among German physicians, 7 a similar conclusion was drawn, namely, to focus on a thorough discussion and transparent evaluations of health care innovations to enhance physicians' acceptance of such measures.
• Also, physician age offers great potential to address MC contract rejections. The problem is aggravated by the increasing age of Germany's physician workforce. Again, our qualitative findings such as financial aspects increased risk taking by physicians or overly complex documentation requirements fit well into this picture, cf. Section 3.3.
• Further, our qualitative (eg, administrative burden, risk) and quantitative results (eg, physician age) suggest that an extra budget for physicians participating in MC covering excess costs for documentation, IT infrastructure, or even staff (eg, documentation assistants) may enhance MC acceptance in the startup phase. Note that this finding is in line with previous results. 5 Economically, an infrastructure budget would render physicians' economic decisions to engage in MC independent of sunk entry costs and, hence, turn their focus to marginal costs and benefits of MC.
• Finally, our results show that specialists and GPs do not differ significantly with respect to their contract rejection behavior. By contrast, MC policy has focused on GPs' gatekeeping role (eg, selection of suitable patients) and ignored the role of specialists to convince patients to enter MC. Hence, German MC could benefit by approaching specialists (a 66% share of all treating physicians) as additional MC gatekeepers.
In addition to the above aspects, our qualitative results underline that questions of morals and ethics seem to play a major role in the acceptance of MC. For example, a thorough public discussion seems to be necessary to remove concerns as to the seemingly discriminative nature of MC, both with respect to patients ("some insured will be favored") and professional autonomy ("did not want to be restricted through such a contract"). Note that these findings are supported by the extant literature.
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| CONCLUSION
Our results show that MC contract rejection by physicians is a common issue with a 60% share of rejecters in the sample. To a large extent, our study supports previous findings such as the role of administrative hurdles, restrictions of professional freedom, and risk taking by individual physicians. However, our results go into more detail using a quantitative model that identifies physicians as heterogeneous gatekeepers in the MC market. For example, the inclusion of private practices into the existing MC market is identified as a challenge with great potential for German health policy. The same holds true for physicians' age-specific MC contracting behavior in view of financial risks and long-term obligations. Here, eg, extra budgets for incurring long-term MC commitments for elderly physicians may be a promising approach for health policy. Our qualitative results also reveal an obvious lack of knowledge about the working mechanisms of MC. From a policy perspective, one may question whether recent health care reforms with a strong institutional focus are suitable to solve the problem. In contrast, the participation decision of the practicing physicians should receive more attention by policymakers.
Limitations of this study include the number of practices in the sample of rejecters and the lack of direct financial practice indicators. The first issue is qualified, however, by comparable sample sizes in the literature which suffers from a general problem to contact practicing physicians during office hours. The second issue is hard to come by in physician telephone surveys as financial data are considered private and would require a longstanding survey relationship to be disclosed. To mitigate the problem, private patient share, working hours, and specialist status are included as proxy variables for income in this study.
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